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THE USE OF THE INJUNCTION TO ABATE SALOONS
The extension of equity into certain fields not generally con-
ceded to be within its ordinary jurisdiction, for example, by the
use of the injunction to prevent crimes and nuisances, is a sub-
ject of considerable discussion and by no means free from con-
flicting opinions. A study of articles and decisions reveals a
wide difference of belief and a doctrine that is far from settled.
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss and attempt to uphold
the use of the injunction to abate nuisances which affect the
public morals and decency as exemplified by saloons.
It is contended that the extension of equity by use of the
injunction to prevent crimes and nuisances is a usurpation of
the power of the criminal courts and without basis or jurisdic-
tion. If a court of equity used its power to prevent a crime as
such, that contention would be true, and wherever it has been
attempted on such ground, equity has refused to take jurisdiction
of the case. 1 The fact of the matter is that equity will not enjoin
an act because it is criminal, but because there are other well
recognized grounds for jurisdiction. That the first part of the
above is true will scarcely be argued today. "At the present
time there is no pretense of enjoining criminal acts as such; in
every case there is a legitimate ground for equity jurisdiction. "-
It is around cases where legitimate grounds exist that the con-*
troversy rages.
An act will not be enjoined as a nuisance merely because it is
criminal. If it is a nuisance, it will be enjoined, although crimi-
nal.3 Before equity will interfere there must be reasons for it
doing so. If reasons exist equity will issue an injunction and it
is immaterial whether the act enjoined is a crime or not.
4
In exercising its power to abate nuisances equity is not
getting into an entirely new field nor going beyond its jurisdic-
tion. Judge Story says,' "In regard to public nuisances the
jurisdiction of courts of equity seems to be of very ancient date,
ILAttorney General v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 John. Ch. 371 (N. Y., 1817);
Commonwealth v. Smith, 266 Pa. 511, 109 At. 786 (1920).
sLyne, 21 Ky. L. J. 81.
3 Pomeroy on Equity, Sec. 1941.
4Walsh on Equity, p. 202.
5 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (VoL 2), Sec. 921.
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and has been distinctly traced back to the reign of Queen
Elizabeth." And continuing, "The ground of this jurisdiction
undoubtedly is their ability to give a more complete and perfect
remedy than is attainable at law, in order to prevent irreparable
mischief, and also to suppress oppressive and vexatious litiga-
tions.' 6 Ile points out that equity can prevent threatened nui-
sances as well as restrain those already existing and by per-
petual injunction make the remedy complete for future time,
whereas a court of law can only reach present nuisances, leaving
future acts to be subject to new prosecutions and proceedings.
The power to abate a nuisance may be said to be inherent
in equity. Practically from the time of its establishment it has
done so. In a very early case equity enjoined a nuisance, the
court holding it was against the law of the land.7 That there is
a general equity jurisdiction as to public nuisances has also been
recognized in this country.8
The fact that equity furnished a more complete and ade-
quate remedy for abating a nuisance than could be had at com-
mon law was a factor in the growth of its jurisdiction in this
type of action. Certainly today the abatement of a nuisance by
injunction is far more efficient and complete than abatement by
the criminal courts. Consider, for example, where under the
criminal law, officers shut up and abate an illegal saloon and fine
its proprietor. This procedure having been carried out as
demanded by law, the worthy proprietor shortly reopens for
business and continues to flourish until the officers again descend
on him. The same procedure is repeated and, chances are. may
be repeated again and again, unless equity steps in and abates
the nuisance.
When it does so, a perpetual injunction is granted against
ever again using the property as a saloon and against the pro-
prietor from conducting his nefarious trade. The citizens of
that neighborhood will no more be harassed by the operation of
the nuisance complained of.
Those opposed to the natural expansion of equity, and zeal-
ous of an inflexible system of criminal law, overlook the existence
%bid., Sec. 924.TBonds Case, Moore 238, 72 Eng. Rep. 553 (1587).
'Beveridge v. Lacey, 3 Rand. (Va.) 63 (1824); Bridge Co. T.
Summers, 13 W. Va. 484 (1878).
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of a common nuisance and protest that equity is enjoining a
crime. They do not know or refuse to acknowledge that "a crime
may be a public nuisance at common law or under a general
nuisance statute. If so, an equitable proceeding has some marked
advantage over a prosecution. It protects the public without
punitive consequences to the defendant for his past conduct. It
operates very rapidly with less risk of miscarriage than a jury
trial involves.'' 9 Because a system operates with "marked
advantage" to the public is it to be relegated to the judicial bone
yard? Because its growth is modern and it dares to "compete"
with an old established system, is it to be branded as unsound
and declared to be an infringement of legal rights?
The fact that the creation or maintenance of a nuisance is
a crime, at common law or under statute, does not deprive a
court of equity of the power to decree its abatement. Equity
was a going concern and handled certain nuisances long before
they were made crimes by statute. The modern trend is but an
out-growth of an ancient and established jurisdiction. But sim-
ply that the act is criminal, as the violation of a law, is not
enough. It is necessary that the nuisance affects civil or property
rights, or privileges of the public, or public health and welfare.
In short there must be a proper ground for equitable jurisdiction.
Thus the rule of equity refusing to enjoin an act merely because
it is a crime, does not preclude injunctive relief where proper
grounds are offered for its jurisdiction.
Mack states there are three classes of situations where the
jurisdiction of equity has been extended.1 0 The second, applic-
able to the present subject, is, Prevention of the violation of
public decency; i. e., saloons and brothels. This jurisdiction, in
the absence of statute, has been based on public nuisance, impair-
ment of the value of adjoining property, and protection of public
welfare under exercise of the police power of the state.
The cases wherein saloons have been abated by injunction
may be divided into two distinct groups. First, those in which
courts exercise this injunctive power under statute, and second,
those in which the courts base their jurisdiction on the fact that
the thing abated is a common nuisance, that it is an injury to
property, or that it affects the public welfare.
9 Chafee, 34 Harv. L. R. 388, 398.
"Mack, 16 Harv. I. R. 389.
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In several states legislatures have enacted statutes making
illegal saloons public nuisances and giving courts of equity juris-
diction to enjoin them. It has been held that a pharmacist, with
a permit to sell liquor for medical purposes who sold it without
conforming to the law, could be enjoined from selling it in such
manner, according to a statute declaring such sale to be a com-
mon nuisance. 1 The rule that parties seeking to enjoin a nui-
sance must show special injury does not apply to a proceeding
under statute to enjoin the maintenance of a nuisance consist-
ing of carrying on the sale of intoxicating liquors.1
2
The leading case of State v. Crawford,13 stated that if a
statute makes a thing illegal it becomes ipso facto a public nui-
sance. The statute here declared an illegal saloon to be a public
nuisance and provided it should be shut up and abated by the
proper officers. The court declined to grant an injunction on the
ground that the remedy at law, under the statute, was adequate.
By way of strong and persuasive dictum, however, the court said
in the absence of such statute equity had jurisdiction to enjoin
an illegal saloon as a common public nuisance.
Another court has said that under the stamp of a common
nuisance equity would have jurisdiction to restrain under "very
old Chancery jurisdiction" without aid from any statute,14 indi-
cating that modern statutes are but declaratory of the established
power of equity courts.
Those denying the right of equity to abate saloons by injunc-
tion, contend that statutes giving it this right are unconstitu-
tional. Hedden v. Hand,'5 holds such statutes are unconstitu-
tional, but this case stands almost alone. The decision given
in this case seems to be contra to all other reported decisions.
On the other hand, with the exception of Hedden v. Hand,1
the courts have uniformly sustained the constitutionality of
statutes conferring upon courts of equity the power to abate a
public nuisance, altho the acts constitute a crime and no prop-
erty rights are involved."7
"State v. Davis, 44 Kan. 60, 24 Pac. 73 (1890).
State v. Ragghianti, 129 Tenn. 560, 167 S. W. 689 (1914).
'- 28 Kan. 726, 42 Am. Rep. 182 (1882).
4 Devanney v. Hanson, 60 W. Va. 3, 53 S. E. 603 (1906).
290 N. J. Eq. 583, 107 At. 285 (1919).
16 Ibid.
1TFulton v. State, 171 Ala. 572, 54 So. 688 (1911); State v. Jordan,
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The leading case holding such statutes constitutional is
Carleton v. Rugg.18 Here a statute gave the right to courts to
abate or restrain a public nuisance upon instigation of the proper
official or upon petition signed by ten or more citizens. In the
particular case a petition was presented signed by ten citizens,
to abate and enjoin the use of a building for selling liquor. The
court granted the injunction and held the act was constitutional.
The case says the state can make what it pleases a public nui-
sance. By the force of this holding the power of equity to enjoin
saloons by virtue of legislative authority and the extension of
its jurisdiction into the field of "crime prevention" have made
tremendous strides that have helped to carry them into many
jurisdictions of the land.
That an act making the illegal selling of liquor a nuisance
and giving equity jurisdiction to enjoin it, does not violate the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor abridge
the right of trial by jury, was held by State v. Marshall."9 In this
case the defendant conducted a soft drink stand in Vicksburg.
Actually he was engaged in the illegal sale of intoxicating liquor
and used the soft drink designation as a false front. In regard
to the argument that jury trial was denied by the statute, the
court said, "The contention is utterly without merit. The court
has jurisdiction, and the trial must be conducted by the rules
of procedure that prevail in a chancery court and jury trial is
no more a matter of right in this than in any other chancery
cases." As to due process the court declared "The procedure
authorized by this statute gives full opportunity for a hearing,
and does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution
of the state or the United States."
In granting this injunction the court said, "When a business
is a public nuisance, no matter how it gets to be such, whether
inherently so or made so by law, the court of chancery has power
to enjoin."
It was held in State v. Murphy,20 that a law, authorizing the
72 Iowa 377, 343 N. W. 285 (1887); Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550,
22 N. E. 55 (1899); State v. Marshall, 100 Miss. 626, 56 So. 792 (1911);
State v. Saunders, 66 N. H. 39, 25 Atl. 588 (1889); Burekell v. State,
47 Tex. Civ. App. 393, 106 S. W. 190 (1917); State v. Murphy, 71 Vt.
127, 41 Atl. 1037 (1898).
28149 Mass. 550, 22 N. E. 55 (1899).
Is 100 Miss. 626, 56 So. 792 (1911).
71 Vt. 127, 41 Atl. 1037 (1898).
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legislature to declare an establishment selling liquor a public
nuisance and to empower the chancery court to enjoin it, did not
invade any right of trial by jury. The court said, "A proceed-
ing against the respondent for violating the injunction would be
no more a criminal proceeding than one would against him for
violating an injunction in a civil proceeding in reference to a
private nuisance."
An Iowa case, Littleton v. Pritz,2 1 held a statute providing
any citizen of a county may maintain an action in equity to enjoin
and abate a nuisance caused by keeping a place for selling liquor,
contra to law, was not unconstitutional as depriving a citizen of
the right of trial by jury. Under this statute the citizen could
bring the action without showing that he was specially damaged
by such nuisance. The court said, "It is important to inquire,
in what cases was right of trial by jury inviolate when the con-
stitution was adopted? For it will be observed that the provi-
sion is that the right 'should remain inviolate.' This provision
or its equivalent is common to the constitutions of many states
of the Union, and it has been held that it secures the right of
trial by jury in all cases in the trial of which a jury was neces-
sary according to the principles of the common law." There is
no provision giving absolute right to jury trial in equity cases.
Where statutes confer power to abate nuisances on courts in
general, by necessary implication a court of chancery is vested
with jurisdiction by statute.22 The statute there made it unlaw-
ful to manufacture and sell intoxicating liquors and made any
place used for such purposes in violation of the statute a common
nuisance, and required such place to be abated as a public
nuisance. The court held the statute constitutional and that a
state under its police power may abate any nuisance prejudicial
to the health or morals of the public. Such action is not taking
property without just compensation, the court pointed out, as
the owner could still use it in a lawful way.
The statutory basis of equity jurisdiction is not the only
basis upon which equity must rely to abate saloons. That a
saloon is a common nuisance, an injury to property, or injuri-
ously affecting the public welfare may furnish a basis for juris.
diction. Injury to property as a jurisdictional factor is undis-
265 Iowa 488, 22 N. W. 641 (1885).
]Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. Ed. 205 (1887).
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puted, but it is not the only one. The general American rule is
that the attorney general or certain citizens can enjoin acts
which do not injure specific property.23 In the case of a public
nuisance it is held that the fact that no property rights are
involved is not material. 24 The state may restrain a criminal
act when its interests or the interests of those entitled to its pro-
tection are affected. Under its police power it may act to protect
public morals and decency.
Having pointed out that equity will enjoin a common or
public nuisance whether the power be inherent or the result of
long use, or granted by statute or in connection with other juris-
dictional grounds, the consequence is that if a saloon be a com-
mon or public nuisance, equity can exercise its power to enjoin
it. Moreover, this power may be invoked against a place for the
sale of liquors, tho there has been no criminal conviction of the
keeper of the place.2 5 It would seem that the criminal conviction
would be immaterial, as, in exercising this power, equity is not
concerned with the criminal aspect but is interested only in
abating a nuisance.
A liquor nuisance, a common term for a saloon, has been
held to be a public nuisance if it annoys such part of the public
as necessarily comes in contact with it.26 "Blind tigers" where
liquor is sold on the sly and contrary to law are public nuisances
and may be abated.2 7 Wherever intoxicating liquor is sold, dis-
pensed, given away, or drunk, is a nuisance, and therefore an
unlicensed social club for use of members only, dealing in liquor
in any way mentioned above is a nuisance. 28 And in Georgia it
was held an "illegal sale of intoxicating liquor is a public nui-
sance, affecting the whole community in which it is carried
on. . .29 It has been held in New Jersey that habitual unlawful
sales of intoxicating liquor constitute the place where sold a
nuisance, 30 while in another state one who in violation of the law
2320 Col. L. R. 605.
2 Columbian Athletic Club v. State, 40 N. E. 914, 143 Ind. 98
(1895); State v. Canty, 207 Mo. 439, 105 S. W. 1078 (1907).
= State v. Riesen, 165 Wis. 258, 161 N. W. 747 (1917).
State v. Tabler, 34 Ind. A. 93, 72 N. E. 1039 (1905).
2, Shreveport v. Maroun, 134 La. 490, 64 So. 388 (1914).
State v. Kaplaski, 105 Me. 127, 73 Atl. 830 (1909).
"Lofton v. Collins, 117 Ga. 434, 43 S. E. 708 (1903).
City of Millville v. Everingham, 101 N. J. Law 826, 129 AtI. 921
(1925).
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sells liquor and has the reputation of so doing, maintains a liquor
nuisance. 31
The fact alone that a liquor nuisance is a persistent and con-
tinuing public wrong is a very strong reason why equity should
undertake to suppress it.
The case of Walker v. MeNely,3 2 illustrates the extent of
equity jurisdiction to abate a saloon because it is a nuisance. In
this case the defendant operated a saloon illegally and the action
to abate it by injunction was brought by the solicitor general
in behalf of the people. The case held since the saloon was main-
tained and operated illegally it was a public nuisance which the
court of equity could abate by injunction. The court went on to
say that even tho the sale was illegal and the persons engaged
therein could be punished under the penal law, since the unlaw-
ful selling was a public nuisance, injuring the entire community,
equity would abate it upon an information Bled by the solicitor
general. The case stands for the fact that equity has jurisdiction
in a suit by the state to abate and enjoin a liquor nuisance,
without reference to statute or to property rights, even tho the
acts constituting a nuisance also constitute a crime.
An Illinois case appears to be based on the fact that an ille-
gal saloon is a nuisance and within the jurisdiction of equity to
abate. In Stead v. Fortner,33 the defendant opened up a saloon
in a dry town and the officers of the law refused or neglected to
take action. The attorney general filed a bill to enjoin the
defendant on the ground of a public nuisance, contrary to the
law and detrimental to the health and morals of the community.
The court granted the injunction and apparently based their
decision on the fact that the defendant was conducting a public
nuisance, and since equity has jurisdiction to abate a public nui-
sance, it was properly exercising its power by enjoining the
defendant and abating the nuisance.
The case might well have had another ground for the inter-
ference of equity-protection of public morals and welfare. The
attorney general included a prayer for such protection in his
bill asking for the injunction. It has been held that a sham
restaurant, wherein liquor is surreptitiously bartered and sold, is
"Allshouse v. Carragher, 171 Iowa 307, 151 N. W. 443 (1915).
121 Ga. 114, 48 S. E. 718 (1904).
"255 Ill. 468, 99 N. E. 680 (1912).
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a resort of various persons whose conduct tends to injure public
morals, peace, and welfare, and can be enjoined.
3 4
One of the oldest grounds of jurisdiction in the field of
abatement by injunction is the protection of property and prop-
erty rights. Equity has always protected property. In abating
nuisances because they injure property rights, equity is standing
on firm ground. In basing jurisdiction on this ground the courts
adopt what they know to be a safe tho narrow basis. While
willing to grant relief on this basis, the courts are strict to
require that the acts enjoined be primarily and essentially an
injury to property. They will not grant an injunction on that
basis if the injury resulting to the property is merely conse-
quential. Where an individual seeks to enjoin a public nuisance
he must have suffered special damage and must show it.
'here he has suffered such damage as the result of an unli-
censed dramshop in the same block with his apartment house,
causing his business in connection with renting apartments to
fall off, he may abate the nuisance by a suit in equity.
35
"If the use of property is one which renders a neighbor's
occupation and enjoyment physically uncomfortable or which
may be hurtful to the health-a private nuisance is deemed to
be established, against which the power of a court of equity
may be invoked." 36
The protection of public welfare under the police power of
the state as a jurisdictional factor in the abatement of nuisances
by injunction, is well recognized and, it would seem, in view of
the complexities of modern civilization, a sound one.
The case of State v. C. B. & Q. R. Co. 3 7 held a liquor nui-
sance could be enjoined when it arises from a persistent viola-
tion of a statute forbidding intoxication and drinking on rail-
way trains. There the defendant was charged with selling liquor
on its trains contra to the laws of the state. The court based its
decision partly on the fact that the acts of the defendant corpo-
ration were ultra vires. It further stated that the comfort and
safety of the traveling public are involved and that the state
under its police power must protect them.
" State v. Lamb, 237 Mo. 437, 141 S. W. 665 (1911).
'Hoyt v. McLoughlin, 250 li. 442, 95 N. E. 464 (1911).
3 Eaton on Equity, p. 553.
- 88 Neb. 669, 130 N. W. 295 (1911).
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Equity will protect public welfare by the use of the injunc-
tion even tho a remedy at law is furnished by statute. In the
absence of such jurisdiction, the public would continue to suffer
where the remedy at law, tho available, was ineffective. In Legg
v. Anderson,3" citizens were allowed to enjoin a "blind tiger" in
the face of a state law which declared such place "shall be
deemed a nuisance, and the same may be abated or enjoined as
such, as now provided by law."
The defendant contended the remedy "provided by law"
was by prosecution and abatement under the criminal law. The
court pointed out that criminal prosecutions have not always
been effective to deter the unscrupulous and lawless from engag-
ing in the illegal traffic and held the remedy here provided is
cumulative of other remedies and could be made available even
in a case where other remedies are themselves complete and
adequate.
In answering the defendant's contentions the court said,8 9
"A law having for its purpose the suppression of an acknowl-
edged existing evil, which is destructive of the welfare and hap-
piness of individuals, should not, of all laws, be frittered away
by construction."
The proposition that equity will enjoin illegal saloons, either
on the basis that the power is conferred by statute, or because
the subject to be enjoined is a common nuisance affecting prop-
erty or public welfare, is ably supported by numerous cases,
some of which have been cited above. It remains to be seen if
equity will enjoin a saloon as a private nuisance. It has been
held that where a private nuisance, as a saloon, injuriously affects
the rights of the complainant in a manner different from that
experienced by the public in general, the power of a court of
equity to grant relief by injunction is not affected by the fact
that the nuisance complained of is also a breach of the criminal
law.
40
A legal sale of intoxicating liquors cannot be enjoined unless
it is a nuisance41 and a saloon with a license and operated legally
8116 Ga. 401, 42 S. E. 720 (1902).
4State v. Ehrlick, 65 W. Va. 700, 64 S. E. 935 (1909); Detroit
Realty Co. v. Barnett, 156 Mich. 385, 120 N. W. 804 (1909).
"State v. Kirkwood Club, 187 S. W. 819 (Mo. App., 1916).
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is not a nuisance per se,42 but in the case of Detroit Realty Co.
v. Barnett,4 3 one so conducted was declared to be a private nui-
sance, and an injunction was granted.
Here the defendant operated a saloon and dance hall under
full license from the state and federal governments. The plain-
tiff owned residences on the same street and in close proximity
to the defendant's saloon. Plaintiff complained of it as a private
nuisance and sought to enjoin it. The court enjoined and
restrained not only the owner from renting or leasing the prem-
ises for such purposes, but perpetually enjoined the defendant
operator, as lessee and occupant, from engaging in this trade
where it would affect the complainant. It must be observed that
here there was no public nuisance but a nuisance affecting the
rights of the plaintiff in a different manner from that experienced
by the general public. The court cited in its opinion State v.
Collins,4 4 which held that equity has jurisdiction to abate a pri-
vate nuisance, altho the nuisance is a breach of the criminal law.
In exercising its power to abate saloons, equity is acting not
to punish the defendant but to protect the public welfare by
closing a common nuisance. One of the advantages of equity
in this field is that it can prevent nuisances as well as abate them.
A further advantage is that equity will prevent a future occur-
rence of a nuisance which is "temporarily" abated, as by the
defendant's own act.
Such advantage is illustrated in the case of Judge v. Kribs.
45
Here the defendant had maintained a saloon contrary to law and
had constituted a public nuisance thereby. He heard that an
injunction would be asked, and, being something of a quick
change artist, he suddenly reformed and quit business. It was
contended that as he had abated the nuisance, the injunction
would not lie. The court felt, however, that the defendant had
reformed only as a "temporary expedient", and held the fact
that the defendant had quit was immaterial. Said the court,
"Having been engaged in violating the law, it is not by any
means certain that they will not do so in the future." And
that the plaintiff was "not obliged to rest its interest on the
"Do Blanc v. Town of New Iberia, 106 La. 680, 31 So. 311 (1902).
"supra (Note 40).
"74 Vt. 43, 52 At. 69 (1901).
671 Iowa 183, 32 N. W. 324 (1887).
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mere assertion of the defendant (made under oath) that he
would not repeat the act of infringement."
The court probably knew from past history that the
defendant had quit only for the time being and realized the
public interest and welfare could better be protected by issuing
an injunction. If the defendant had actually quit he would
not be prejudiced tho the injunction were granted. As long as
he conducted himself in a lawful manner he had nothing to fear.
On the other hand all the power of equity would be arrayed
against him should he again decide to establish and maintain a
common nuisance contrary to public policy. Such far-sighted
jurisdiction cannot fail to have a beneficial effect on all within
its reach-the one against whom it is invoked as well as those
on whose behalf it is employed.
To summarize, equity has had jurisdiction to abate nuisances
by means of the injunction from practically the time of its incep-
tion. The power to do so is inherent in equity doctrine. In
modern times the power is amply conferred by statutes, either
directly or by implication. It is exercised, too, in the absence
of statute where the nuisance, and specifically the saloon, is a
common public nuisance, and even where it is a private nuisance.
It is employed to protect property and property rights. It is
further strengthened by the police power of the state to protect
public morals and decency by means that are speedy, efficient,
and complete.
It may be well to repeat that in enjoining nuisances which
are also crimes, equity is not acting as a court of criminal pro-
ceeding. There is no two-fold jurisdiction of one act but separate
and distinct jurisdictions of separate results of the same act.
"When the result is a crime, unquestionably the criminal court
alone has jurisdiction. But where the act results in a common
nuisance, equity has jurisdiction to act, regardless of other
results. Such exercise of power is not an exception to the rule
that equity will not enjoin a crime as such. Such exercise of
power is a rule itself, clearly within the jurisdiction of equity.
Equity has always had jurisdiction to enjoin a public nuisance
and it will do so today, whether the nuisance be a crime or not.
There is nothing in such exercise of power that can be construed
as an "exception" to any rule.
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The exercise of such jurisdiction-in an era when the admin-
istration of criminal law is unsatisfactory and apparently break-
ing down-is salutary and deserves the serious consideration of
those who study and administer the law in the light of future
growth and improvement.
GEORGE 0. ELDRED
K. L. J.-7
